How to act as a good NSP peer?

Sam Sham



PEERING ASIA 5.0



- Cost saving
- Latency
- Better routing control



How to evaluate your potential peers?



- Company peering policy.
- Own flow data
- Peeringdb

Customer <

• AS data, ASRank by ASCaida.


NSRank

Looking Glass URL	http://lg.retn.net/
Network Type	NSP
IPv4 Prefixes ?	80000
IPv6 Prefixes ?	8000
Traffic Levels	10-20Tbps
Traffic Ratios	Balanced
Geographic Scope	Global
Protocols Supported	⊘ Unicast IPv4 ⊘ Multicast ⊘ IPv6 ⊖ Never via route servers ●



What's ASRank?


- Long term research project from Center for Applied Internet Data Analysis(CAIDA) based at the San Diego Supercomputer Center in US.
- Interpret the data from Route Views Project and RIPE NCC to infer the relationship between ASes.
- Ranking is concluded based on the customer cone.





Customer cone

effects of changing the link beween **A** and **B** to a peering link



When there is a change of relationship between ASN, customer size would be changed accordingly!!



How can ASRank help?

- Provide an objective way on evaluating the peering
- Open-source data so that you can integrate with your own system
- Monthly update on the source data/Quarterly update on WebUI usually.
- Ranking for content-related ASN is not appropriate because they seldom do transit for another ASNs.

ASTank About - Ranking - Search Contact Data - FAQ Feedback Reark is CAIDA's ranking of Autonomous Systems (AS) (which approximately map to Internet Service Providers) and organizations (Orgs) (which are a collection of one or more ASes). This ranking is derived from topological data collected by CAIDA's Archipelago Measurement Infrastructure and Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) routing data collected by the Route Views Project and RIPE NCC. ASes and Orgs are ranked by their customer cone size, which is the number of their direct and indirect customers. Note: We do not have data to rank ASes (ISPs) by traffic, revenue, users, or any other non-topological metric. ASN name or number 1900 ASes are sorted by their relationship, which is inferred from observed BGP paths. Note: we do not have data to infer financial arrangements between ASes AS Rank AS Number Organization cone size (ASes) 🗸 1 3356 Level 3 Parent, LLC 49594 1299 Arelion Sweden AB 40438 174 Cogent Communications 37017 11 6762 TELECOM ITALIA SPARKLE S.p.A. 22144 2914 NTT America, Inc. 20225 6939 Hurricane Electric LLC 20168 6461 Zayo Bandwidth 18217 6453 TATA COMMUNICATIONS (AMERICA) INC 18210 3257 9 GTT Communications Inc 17924 10 3491 PCCW Global, Inc. 10442

*

0

....

https://asrank.caida.org/ https://www.caida.org/catalog/datasets/as-relationships/

RETN Limited

Orange S.A.

Vodafone Group PLC



11

12

13

9002

1273


5511

9008

6909

6563


• RPKI – Reduce the risk of route leak and BGP hijacking.




Source: NIST RPKI monitor 19 Oct 2023

RETN®

• RPKI status – South Korea






Source: Stats Lab APNIC 19 Oct 2023

RETN®

- BGP hijack South Korea in 2022---- KlaySwap, cryptocurrency platform.
- Hackers stole USD\$1.9million worth of digital assets by redirecting the user to a malicious version of KakaoTalk.





2023 Source: https://www.manrs.org/2022/02/klayswap-anotherbgp-hijack-targeting-crypto-wallets/


- Does RoV filtering really helps?
- Answer: **YES!**
- 75% of traffic goes to the correct destination
- Invalid route propagation has been reduced by 1/2 to 2/3

source: How much does RPKI ROV reduce the propagation of invalid routes? (Doug Madory & Job Snijders, 2023) https://www.kentik.com/blog/how-much-does-rpki-rov-reduce-the-propagation-of-invalid-routes/

source: Where Did My Packet Go? Measuring the Impact of RPKI ROV(Koen van Hove, 2022) https://labs.ripe.net/author/koen-van-hove/where-did-my-packet-go-measuring-the-impact-of-rpki-rov/




- Anti-spoofing BCP38 aka RFC2827 Network Ingress Filtering
- Validate the packet at the inbound
- Easy to implement: Juniper/Cisco/Huawei are all supporting for uRPF(unicast Reverse Path Forwarding)
- Save bandwidth and minimize the amount of malicious traffic.
- No additional cost.
- Our practice: rpf-check strict mode for IP customer rpf-check loose mode for IPT customer.



Source: https://spoofer.caida.org/summary.php



- Flowspec introduced in 2009 RFC5575
- Implemented on eBGP and control via NLRI(Network Layer Reachability Information)
- Enable features to exchange the information about specific flows in network.




Source: https://www.juniper.net/documentation/en_US/day-one-books/DO_BGP_FLowspec.pdf



• Simple word: Dynamic firewall implemented on eBGP connections/Upgraded RTBH.

Traffic match	Traffic action
drc/dst IP	Drop
Length	Rate-limit (shaper)
IP protocol	Mark (DSCP)
src/dst ports	Redirect to VRF(e.g., to DPI scrubber)
TCP flags	
DSCP	
Fragment	





Pros	Cons
Easy to implement	Hardware limitation(up to several thousands of rules)
Multiple vendor supported(Cisco/Juniper/Huawei/etc)	Need to identify the attack flow properly
Provide granularity to control the flow of the DDoS attack	



Minor but also important

- Maintain a network without packet loss
- Responsive 24x7 support
- Maintain an up-to-date peeringdb profile for your ASN. This is one of the requirement to peer with major CDNs and operators (Eg. Cloudflare, AWS, MS, etc)

Packets: Sent = 4, Received = 4, Lost = 0 (0% loss),







